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Background:  Inequality emphasizes the distinction between us and them which forms the 
basis for ethnocentrism. 
 
Aim:  The aim of the study was to examine the effect of status on the emergence of 
ethnocentrism and selfishness using a minimal group situation under equal and unequal 
conditions.  
 
Methodology:  The study used a mixed experimental design.  A sample of 224 students from 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal was recruited using non-probability sampling.  The effect 
of status on the production of ethnocentric and selfish behaviour among low, equal and high 
status participants was investigated using the Virtual Interaction Application’s (VIAPPL) 
give-and-get token exchange game.  The effect of interaction on ingroup identity, the 
legitimacy and stability of the experimental situation and sense of competition was measured 
using a pre- and post-test questionnaire.  The VIAPPL data was analysed using generalised 
linear models.  The psychometric data was analysed using repeated measures analyses of 
variance.  
 
Results:  The VIAPPL data indicated that identity as a group member was the most important 
factor determining ethnocentric behaviour (F(1, 220)=34.74; p<0.001; η2=0.14).  Low status 
participants exhibited significantly more ethnocentrism than high status participants (F(1, 
108)=30.83; p<0.001; η2=0.22).  Inequality significantly increased ethnocentric behaviour 
(F(1, 220)=4.20; p<0.04; η2=0.02).  No significant differences in selfishness were found 
between low- and high status participants. Individuals demonstrated significantly more 
selfishness than group members (F(1, 220)=10.08; p<0.001; η2=0.04).  The psychometric 
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data indicated that group members exhibited significantly greater ingroup identity (F(1, 215) 
= 9.29, p<0.001, η2 = 0.04) following interaction.  There were no significant differences in 
the legitimacy or stability of the experimental condition.  The competition subscale was 
excluded due to poor reliability.    
 
Discussion/Conclusion:  Social identity theory’s position that high status produces 
ethnocentrism was contradicted by the emergence of ethnocentrism among low status 
participants.  However, this phenomenon has been observed where status differences are 
perceived as illegitimate or unstable.  Generosity toward low status participants may also 
account for reduced ethnocentrism among high status participants.  The finding that 
individuals exhibit greater selfishness than group members suggests that ethnocentrism 
emerges to serve the best interests of the group and is not simply a facet of individual 
selfishness. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “All men are created equal” (US Declaration of Independence, Paragraph two, 1776) but we 
live in a world of inequality where there are great differences in wealth, status and power 
among people and societies.  Blackburn (1999, p. 4) suggests that equality is not the opposite 
of inequality.  Rather “there is a continuum of inequality, increasing from zero to infinity.  
Zero is defined as equality, while the rest of the range is inequality.”  It could be argued that 
striving for equality is not actually fair because equality suppresses social diversity, creates 
sameness and leads to a rejection of difference (Blackburn, 1999).  However, an argument for 
the rejection of equality based on these points is logically unsound because it equates equality 
with conformity. In contrast, a truly equal social system allows people to be different but still 
considered socially equal (Blackburn, 1999).  However, Blackburn (1999) suggests that there 
is a strong link between inequality and difference.  For instance, there is no logical reason 
why dark-skinned people should be socially disadvantaged in predominantly white societies 
and yet they are.  Socially recognised differences create the distinction between us and them 
which forms the basis for ethnocentrism.  The major problem associated with ethnocentrism 
is that ethnocentric people tend to view outgroups as homogenous which enhances 
stereotypes and affects the way ingroup and outgroup members interact.   
 
The Focus of this Dissertation 
The focus of this dissertation is on the phenomenon of ethnocentrism, defined as “an 
attitudinal construct that involves a strong sense of ethnic group self-centredness and self-
importance” (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, & Krauss, 2009, p. 874).  According to 
Bizumic et al. (2009, p. 874) there are two types of ethnocentrism: intergroup and intragroup 
ethnocentrism.  Intergroup ethnocentrism involves the belief that your own ethnic group is 
superior to all other ethnic groups, whereas intragroup ethnocentrism involves the belief that 
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the group is more important that its individual members.  Defining ethnocentrism as ethnic 
self-centredness rather than mere ingroup favouritism allows for a fuller examination of the 
constructs that drive people to exhibit ethnocentric behaviour while conceptually 
distinguishing ethnocentrism from outgroup hostility (xenophobia) (Hammond & Axelrod, 
2006).  
 
When ethnocentrism is expressed in its intergroup form ethnocentric people tend to favour 
their ingroup over outgroups, believe that their ingroup is greater than any outgroup, desire 
ethnic purity within the ingroup and accept the exploitation of outgroups when it is in the 
ingroup’s interest to do so (Bizumic et al., 2009).  Ethnocentrism in its intragroup form 
involves a devotion to the ingroup and the desire for group cohesion (Bizumic et al., 2009).  
 
Given the huge inequalities that exist in the world, the effect of status on the emergence of 
ethnocentrism is an interesting research topic. For the purpose of this dissertation status is 
defined as social standing based on wealth as this provides a clear illustration of tangible 
differences between individuals and groups. It is acknowledged that status is social life does 
not only refer to differences in resources and that status differences can be found in groups 
where all members may have the same economic status (Lachenicht, 2016). For instance, in 
many social systems older people are often assigned higher status than children even if they 
do not have more money or resources (Lachenicht, 2016). Thus, if ethnocentrism is as natural 
and commonly occurring as researchers have suggested  (Allport, 1962; Brewer, 1979; Hogg 
& Abrams, 1990; Jahoda & Krewer, 1997; McGee, 1900; Sumner, 1906; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986) one wonders what happens in instances where the ingroup is clearly not superior and 
there are visible status differences between groups.  Do low status groups simply not exhibit 
ethnocentric behaviour or do they attempt to assimilate into a higher status group?  Perhaps, 
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under unequal circumstances, status differences are rejected or the high status of the outgroup 
is denied or attacked?  Maybe the intragroup ethnocentrism principle tenet is rejected in 
favour of an individual selfishly attempting to gain superiority within the low status group?  
This dissertation will examine the effect of status on the emergence of ethnocentrism under 
conditions of equality and inequality in light of existing literature and the experiment 
conducted for the present study.  
 
The Organisation of this Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter two contains a critical 
review of literature on ethnocentrism. Chapter three lists the research aims, rationale and 
hypotheses.  Chapter four details the methodology.  The results are presented in chapter five 
and discussed in chapter six.  Chapter seven notes the present study’s limitation and suggests 
further areas of research to extend the study in chapter eight.  The dissertation concludes with 




Chapter 2: Literature Review  
The chapter begins with a brief history on the evolution of ethnocentrism and 
then moves on to review literature on inequality, status and selfishness 
associated with ethnocentrism. The chapter concludes with an outline of the 
present study’s contribution to the existing body of knowledge. 
 
The Evolution of Ethnocentrism 
The concept of ethnocentrism was first introduced by Polish sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz 
in 1881 although William Sumner, the American social scientist, has been widely credited for 
its early definition and popularization (Bizumic, 2014).  Early definitions of ethnocentrism 
included an outgroup hostility component which was central to the development of influential 
theories such as realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966).  Later definitions abandoned the need 
for outgroup hostility in favour of an emphasis on ingroup bias, this gave rise to social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  Contemporary literature has further removed the 
negative connotations associated with the term bias by choosing to refer to ethnocentrism as 
ingroup favouritism derived from a sense of group self-centredness and self-importance 
(Bizumic, 2014).  A brief description of key theories detailing the evolution of ethnocentrism 
will now be presented.  
 
Early Ethnocentrism 
In its earliest form, written in German, ethnocentrism or “ethnocentrismus” was 
conceptualised as a grandiose “delusion” that humans have a subjective need to focus on their 
own ethnic group and place this group in a superior position to every other group (Bizumic, 
2014, p. 4).  In 1883, Gumplowicz (pp. 252-253) illustrated the early ethnocentric principles 




So far most writing of history is dominated by limited ethnocentric viewpoints. . . . 
One can comfortably say that the largest part of historical writing so far actually has 
only sprung from this subjective need of human beings to glorify their own and 
nearest and at the same time humiliate and sully what is foreign and distant. 
 
Throughout Gumplowicz’s writing at the end of the 19th century he identified many examples 
of ethnocentric perceptions across different nationalities.  According to Gumplowicz, the 
Ancient Greeks displayed ethnocentrism in their description of all other groups as barbarians 
(Gumplowicz, 1887)  Evidence of ethnocentric views were identified in the French, who 
believed that they were more civilised than everyone else (Gumplowicz, 1887), the Germans, 
due to Hegel’s assertion that Germans were godlike, the Chinese, who stated their country 
was at the centre of the world and the Jews who believe that they are God’s chosen people 
(Gumplowicz, 1895).  Further, Gumplowicz recognised the close link between religion and 
ethnocentrism in his claim that many ethnic groups share religious beliefs that all humans are 
descendent from their group (Bizumic, 2014; Gumplowicz, 1881).   
 
Gumplowicz’s ethnocentrism also identified components of Sherif’s realistic conflict theory 
when he suggested that conflicts between ethnic groups arise because of competing interests 
for economic or material resources (Bizumic, 2014).  He proposed that hostility toward other 
groups may stem from group cohesion and devotion to the group (Bizumic, 2014).  
   
In 1906, Sumner introduced the terms ethnocentrism, ingroup and outgroup to American 
academic literature in his influential book Folkways.  Ethnocentrism was referred to as 




A view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others 
are scaled and rated with reference to it…  Each group nourishes its own pride and 
vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on 
outsiders.  Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones…ethnocentrism 
leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is 
peculiar and which differentiates them from others. (Sumner, 1906, p. 13) 
 
Sumner’s theoretical conception of ethnocentrism was very similar to Gumplowicz’s in that 
one’s own group was perceived as central and superior to other groups.  Sumner proposed 
that ethnocentric behaviour stems from folkways, referring to appropriate ways of acting in 
particular contexts.  Folkways are learnt through interaction, imitation and perpetuated over 
time until they are established as social norms (Sumner, 1906).  He suggested that ingroup 
bias and outgroup discrimination exist simultaneously as pro-ingroup and anti-outgroup 
attitudes held by ethnocentric people.      
 
Stemming from Sumner’s work, Sherif (1937) illustrated how social norms are developed in 
his experiment on autokinetic movement.  In this experiment participants were asked to judge 
the distance that a beam of light moved over a series of exposures.  During the experiment the 
room was completely dark giving participants no objective cues to allow them to gauge the 
distance accurately.  Participants acting as individuals established their own standard point 
and range of movement.  However, those participating as group members conformed to the 
group standard, although at times with some resistance.  When group members were asked to 
judge the distance as individuals they referenced the group norm and range.  This experiment 
demonstrated the role of suggestion in the formation of attitudes and the power of groups in 
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prescribing normative behaviour.     
 
Sherif’s later work on ethnocentrism suggested that ethnocentric behaviour is triggered by 
real or perceived conflict between groups competing for scarce resources such as wealth 
status or power (Sherif, Harvey, White, Wood, & Sherif, 1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  The 
1954 Robber’s Cave experiment was fundamental in demonstrating how groups form and 
engage in ethnocentric behaviour (Sherif et al., 1961).  In this experiment the researchers split 
24 white boys of approximately 12 years old, from lower middle-class Protestant 
backgrounds into two groups.  The experiment proved that bringing individuals together to 
interact in group activities leads to the development of a group structure with hierarchical 
status roles.  Further, it showed that competition between groups could lead to intergroup 
conflict (Sherif et al., 1961).  The findings also indicated that intergroup conflict may be 
eliminated through intergroup cooperation for the attainment of superordinate goals.  A brief 
summary of the Robber’s Cave experiment is presented below to illustrate Sherif’s 
conception of ethnocentrism.   
 
The Robbers Cave experiment was conducted over three stages.  During the first stage 
participants established their ingroup through a series of cooperative activities that required 
discussion and planning to execute the activities successfully.  Through these activities a 
hierarchical group structure was formed and group members took on different roles within 
the structure (Sherif et al., 1961).  Group identity was further strengthened by the adoption of 
group names which gave group members a shared identity.  
 
During the second stage, the researchers manipulated competitive attitudes between the 
groups which led to the participants claiming camp facilities such as the baseball pitch and 
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swimming hole as their own, for their exclusive use.  Formal competitions between the 
groups were arranged by the researchers where there could only be a winning group and a 
losing group.  Participation in these competitions led to an increase in outgroup 
discrimination through name-calling, refusal to share common spaces as well as theft and 
destruction of the other group’s property.  In addition, ingroup cooperation and cohesion 
appeared to be increased by the presence of an antagonistic outgroup (Sherif et al., 1961).  
For instance, during an ingroup swimming activity group members encouraged less able 
swimmers to participate and improve their swimming ability by providing support and 
encouragement.  
 
In the final stage of the experiment, the researchers demonstrated that contrived contact 
activities, such as sharing a dining hall or watching a movie together was not enough to 
reduce hostility between groups.  In fact, meaningless interaction appeared to increase 
antagonistic behaviour between groups.  However, when groups were faced with a 
superordinate goal that was important to both groups but beyond the resources of a single 
group, cooperation between groups proved to eliminate the intergroup conflict.  For instance, 
the researchers led the participants to believe that vandals had broken the water tanks that 
supplied drinking water to the camp and the participants needed to fix this problem.  Working 
together members of both groups contributed to fixing the drinking water problem.  
Following this positive and cooperative interaction, evidence of reduced conflict between 
groups was demonstrated by the members of one group allowing the other group to drink the 
water first. The generous group stated that the other group needed the water more because 
they had not brought water canisters with them.  Unlike previous interactions, this gesture 
was not accompanied by any ladies first taunts.  Following a series of additional cooperative 
intergroup activities the participants concluded the experiment by peacefully sharing the 
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dining hall, sharing prize money to purchase members of both groups drinks and electing to 
travel to their hometown on the same bus. However, it should be noted that the Robbers Cave 
experiment has been criticised for gender bias and that scholars have questioned whether 
similar experiments sampling girls might have produced the same results (Tyerman & 
Spencer, 1983).      
 
Through the Robber Cave experiment and similar studies conducted by Sherif’s team, 
realistic conflict theory was developed and provided an etiology for intergroup hostility that 
is driven by conflict over competition for scarce resources (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  In 
addition, Tajfel and Turner (1979) asserted that intragroup cohesiveness, morale and 
cooperation is enhanced by intergroup conflict and competition.  In contrast, intergroup 
hostility and outgroup discrimination was shown to be reduced through intergroup 
cooperation (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif et al., 1961).  
 
Abandoning the need for outgroup discrimination in ethnocentrism 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) identified a key element of Sherif’s research on ethnocentrism 
which appears to have been overlooked or regarded as an epiphenomenon of intergroup 
conflict.  Unlike Sherif’s version of ethnocentrism that suggested that ethnocentric behaviour 
is the result of intergroup conflict and competition, Tajfel proposed that identifying with a 
group was essential to elicit ethnocentric behaviour.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) critiqued 
realistic conflict theory suggesting that the theory did not take into account the development 
and maintenance of group identity and its subsequent effects on ingroup and intergroup 
behaviour.  According to Tajfel and Turner (1979) although intergroup conflict is sufficient 
for provoking ethnocentrism it is not a necessary condition.  Rather the baseline condition 
necessary for producing ethnocentrism is categorization into ingroups and outgroups (Billig, 
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1976; Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
The classic social psychology minimal group situation experiments demonstrated that 
ingroup favouritism could be produced through minimal conditions (Tajfel, et al., 1971).  A 
minimal group is defined by three fundamental characteristics (i) groups must have no history 
or should be created for the purpose the study, (ii) the criterion for differentiation should be 
arbitrary, and (iii) groups should have no face to face contact.  These conditions are necessary 
in order to maintain the integrity of the experiment by ensuring that the presence of bias is 
not caused by pre-existing prejudice.  In addition, criterion based differentiation, such artistic 
preference or estimation ability, is included to foster a minimal sense of identification with 
the ingroup.  Criterion based differentiation is important because Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) 
found that there was no significant difference in ingroup favouritism when participants were 
aware that they had been randomly categorised into groups.  In reality, random assignment to 
groups is necessary to ensure that there is no systematic difference between groups which 
could account for the experiment’s findings. 
  
Psychological attachment to the group was essential in Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) conception 
of the group and intra- and intergroup processes that produce ethnocentrism.  Tajfel and 
Turner (1979, p. 40) defined a group as “a collection of individuals who perceive themselves 
to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this 
common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the 
evaluation of their group and of their membership of it”.  Social categories are defined as 
“cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the 
individual to undertake many forms of social action” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40).  Further, 
social categories serve as a system of orientation for self-reference because they create and 
define the individual’s place in society in addition to providing a means to systematise the 
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social world.  
Before discussing social identity theory which accounts for the underlying factors that lead 
people to engage in ethnocentrism it is useful to briefly describe the original minimal group 
experiments that led to the formation of this theory. A minimal group was used to 
demonstrate that ethnocentrism could be produced through social categorization (Tajfel et al., 
1971).  After participants had been assigned to groups they allocated points (i.e. scarce 
resources) to members of their ingroup or outgroup using a matrix.  Participants were 
required to make two allocations to either two members of the ingroup, two members of the 
outgroup or one member of the ingroup and one member from the outgroup.  Throughout the 
original minimal group studies participants never allocated points to themselves.  The 
rationale for this was that the absence of interaction or personal influence would allow for a 
clearer demonstration of ingroup bias (Paris, Bristol, Oregon, & Stirling, 1972).  
 
There were five basic allocation strategies available to participants.  Participants could adopt 
the “parity” strategy where equal points were awarded to both recipients (Bourhis, Sachdev, 
& Gagnon, 1994).  Parity was the fairest strategy participants could select.  Participants could 
have also chosen the “maximum joint profit” option, an economically rational strategy in 
which both recipients are awarded the maximum number of points.  Another strategy 
available was the “maximum ingroup profit” strategy which awarded the highest number of 
points to the ingroup member regardless of the points awarded to the outgroup member.  This 
seems like a logically economic strategy because it allows the ingroup member to gain the 
most number of points, although in some cases the outgroup members would have been 
awarded more points that the ingroup member.  Participants were also able to select the 
“maximum difference” strategy.  In this option the ingroup member was awarded a higher 
number of points than the outgroup member.  This strategy created the greatest difference in 
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point allocations between ingroup and outgroup recipient, in favour of the ingroup member.  
However, this strategy was not economically rational because it awarded fewer points to the 
ingroup than the maximum ingroup profit strategy but it did create positive ingroup 
distinction.  The last strategy available to participants was the “outgroup favouritism” option.  
This was the least economically rational strategy in relation to ethnocentrism because it 
required the participant to allocate the most points to an outgroup member.  
 
The results of numerous replications of the minimal group experiment indicate that 
participants consistently tend to favour the ingroup over the outgroup by opting for the 
maximum difference strategy (Diehl, 1990; Bourhis et al., 1994; Tajfel, et al., 1971; Lowery, 
Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006).  This is despite having options available that appear more 
economically rational which would result in higher profits to ingroup members such as the 
maximum ingroup profit strategy or maximum joint profit strategy albeit in some instances 
this would allow outgroup members to benefit more (Bourhis, et al., 1994).  The tendency to 
favour the ingroup in minimal group studies is interesting given that participants never 
directly benefit from their allocations.   These findings suggest that participants in these 
studies act in terms of their ingroup membership and intergroup categorization rather than as 
individuals.  The least used strategy was the outgroup favouritism option, although this 
response was observed in studies where low status groups acknowledged their inferiority in 
relation to high status groups (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Rubin, Badea, & 
Jetten, 2013; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987; 1991)  
 
Based on the findings of the original minimal group situation studies, social identity theory 
was developed to account for the intergroup behaviour observed during these experiments.  
Social identity is refers to the identity that social groups provide for group members (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1986).  These identities are both relational and comparative because they give group 
members indicators to define themselves as similar to or different from, as well as, better or 
worse than members of other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  According to social identity 
theory these comparisons and the tendency to favour the ingroup are driven by the need to 
generate a positive self-concept.  In order for a person’s social group to influence their 
behaviour the individual must first internalise their ingroup membership as an aspect of their 
self-concept.  Thus, a social identity cannot be imposed on a person because he/she needs to 
adopt that identity.  However, in some instances it could be argued that certain group 
characteristics such as racial markers, language or biological sex are so defining that it would 
be almost impossible for individuals to reject the social identity that accompanies these 
characteristics. The main point of this line of argument is that for an individual to adopt a 
social identify as his/her own he/she needs to internalise that social identity. For instance, 
biological sex is a good example of a social identity that is often imposed on people, gender 
nonconformist are often punished socially for behaving in an atypical manner. However, 
trans* people have created a social identity of their own which rejects the social identity that 
accompanies their biological sex (Worthington, Savoy, Dillon, & Vernaglia, 2002).  
 
Social identity can be positive or negative based on the status of the social groups to which a 
person belongs.  In addition, the value of one’s own group is determined with reference to 
other relative groups through social comparisons.  However, not all groups are used in these 
social comparisons, only groups that can be meaningfully compared (Brunner & Sandner, 
2012; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979).  To maintain a positive social identity the ingroup 
needs to be positively differentiated or distinct in some way from other outgroups.  However, 
when a social identity proves to be unsatisfactory there are a few strategies that group 
members may implement to improve their social identity.  Individual group members may 
24 
 
attempt to leave their current group to join a better group or collectively group members they 
may strive to improve their existing group.  The strategy selected by group members depends 
on characteristics of the social system in which they exist. These characteristics relate to the 
perceptions held by group members associated with the legitimacy and stability of the status 
differences and effectiveness of competition.  A more detailed exploration of these 
characteristics will be presented under the heading  the consequences of inequality and the 
effect of status on the production of ethnocentrism. 
 
Thus far the writer has made a concerted effort to focus on theories that have emphasised 
group influence in producing ethnocentrism rather than individualistic theories such as the 
authoritarian personality theory which suggests ethnocentrism is associated with personality 
characteristics such as rigid thought processes (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950).  Social identity theory, as described in the previous paragraph, suggests that a 
positive social identity rests on the individual’s desire to maintain a positive self-esteem by 
seeking positive distinctiveness for the group.  The danger of the self-esteem hypothesis is 
that an emphasis on the individual as the unit of analysis rather than the group represents a 
step backwards in defining a social psychology theory of intergroup behaviour.  Social 
identity theory is complemented by self-categorization theory’s recognition that the group has 
as much or perhaps more influence on the individual as the individual has on the group when 
regarding social identity.   
 
Therefore, it is important to focus on the interdependency of the individual and social aspects 
of social identity theory that are used to explain the intereaction in everyday exchanges 
between people.  Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 34) noted that people are influenced by their 
personal characteristics as well as their social identities when interacting with others, they 
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referred to this as the “interpersonal ↔ intergroup continuum”.  The social situation 
determines which end of the continuum a person will interact from.  For instance, when 
interacting with a close relation such as an intitimate partner or old friend, a person will be 
inclined to act and be perceived in terms of their individual characterististics and their 
interpersonal relationship (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  In contrast, under circumstances where 
interactions are based on group memberships, people are likely to be perceived soley based 
on their affiliation to the group and would be viewed as homogenous.  For instance, soldiers 
from opposing countries are likely to be perceived as a stereotyped group of representatives 
with little or no regard for their personal characteristics (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
 
The Consequences of Inequality and the Effect of Status on the Production of Ethnocentrism 
Comtemporary research indicates that status effects the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism 
and outgroup discrimination (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Bourhis & Gagnon, 2003; Rubin et al., 
2013).  Before discussing inequality and its effect on ethnocentrism, it is useful to properly 
conceptualise equality. Often equality is mistakenly equated  with the notion that something 
must be identical for it to be equal.  This fallacy is elegantly dimissed by Blackburn’s (2008, 
p. 251) illustration of equal triangles.  In Figure 1 there are two equal eqilateral triangles, the 
third scalene triangle is also considered equal even though it is not identical. However, both 
types of triangles are considered equal when they cover the same amount of area.  Gender 
equality debates offer a real world example of equality that does not necessarily require 
agents to be identical.  While men and women may be considered equal they do not have to 
be identical.  For instance, a male or female may be equally eligible for the same occupations 




Figure 1. Blackburn’s equal triangles. 
 
In contrast, social inequality often leads to differences in social status.  Social inequality is 
defined as “the condition where people have unequal access to valued resources, services and 
positions in the society” (Kerbo, 2003, p. 11) and social status is defined as “a ranking or 
heierarchy of perceived prestige” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 37).  Under conditions of 
inequality which support differential status positions in a social hierarchy it is difficult to 
logically conceive that low status groups could convincingly regard themselves as better than 
high status groups.  In fact, among stratified groups it is generally high status groups that 
exhibit ethnocentrism while low status groups often engage in outgroup favouritism.  The 
phenomenon of outgroup favouritism among low status groups has been observed by various 
researchers (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Kippenberg, 1993; Frederico, 1998; Lei & Vesely, 2010; 
Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Rubin et al., 2013; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  For instance, minority or 
subordinate groups such as black South Africans, black Americans, New Zealand Maoris and 
French Canadians consitently tend to favour the dominant outgroup and derogate their own 
ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Evidence of outgroup favouritism has been documented 
throughout history for instance Aristotle claimed that only Greeks possess perfectly balanced 
positive qualities which are lacking in other groups (Gumplowicz, 1892). This is interesting 
given that Aristotle himself was a Macedonian and was exiled from Greece because he was a 
foreigner (Gray, 2011). Various social psychology studies have also documented this 
phenomenon, for example in studies that have reported black pre-schoolers’ preferences for 
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white dolls (high status) over black dolls (low status) (Clark & Clark, 1939; Horowitz, 1939; 
Hraba & Grant, 1970; Hughes, Kiecolt, Keith, & Demo, 2015).  The notion of outgroup 
favouritism directly contradicts Sherif’s (1961) assertion that inequality between groups 
should provoke ethnocentrism by both groups because status differences tend to accentuate 
intergroup conflict.  
 
Outgroup favouristism appears to be contingent on the environmental factors that support the 
social system.  Firstly, the status differences between the high and low status groups need to 
be accepted as legitimate (Lei & Vesely, 2010; Rubin et al., 2013).  Secondly, the social 
system needs to be regarded as stable (Lei & Vesely, 2010; Rubin et al., 2013).  Thirdly, 
there needs to be no exisiting intergroup competition or conflict (Lei & Vesely, 2010).  
 
Legitimacy, stability and competition. 
The perceived legitimacy and stability of hierarchial social systems appear to be the most 
important contributing factors for ethnocentric attitudes among groups.  The legitimacy and 
stability of a social system is protected  by the range of social comparisons that are available 
to groups (Brunner & Sandner, 2012).  Often status differences reduce perceived similarity 
between groups and only relatively similar groups engage in social comparison.  When 
subordinate groups internalise their identity as inferior they tend to accept the differential 
status positions of the exisiting social system (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  When these social 
systems are perceived as stable, the social identity of groups is secure (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979).  In addition, dominant groups who are perceived as legitimate tend to be intolerant of 
attempts by lower status groups who try to change the intergroup situation.   
 
However, when status differences between groups are perceived as illegitimate or the social 
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system is viewed as unstable, low status groups may question the existing social environment 
in an effort to strive for positive distinctiveness.  Low status groups may engage in one of the 
following strategies to achieve positive distinction.  Individual members of low status groups 
may attempt to move from their ingroup into a higher status outgroup (Bettencourt et al., 
2001; Tajfel, 1982).  Individual mobility is an individualist approach that represents a 
disidentification with the ingroup (Tajfel, 1982).  While a single member of the low status 
group may benefit through this strategy it does not effect the low status of the individual’s 
former group.  Upward social mobility is characterised by the American dream ideal, which 
posits that individuals may climb the social ladder through hard work, talent and ambition 
(Hirschman, 1970).  However, this strategy is not always available. For instance it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for a person to change their race, although examples of racial 
reclassification were noted during South Africa’s apartheid era where light skinned non-
whites who were able to pass for white changed their racial classification in order to benefit 
from the oppressive nature of the apartheid system (Ifekwunigwe, 2015; Watson, 1970).    
 
When individual mobility is unavailable or undesirable, low status groups may engage in 
social creativity or social change.  Choosing to engage in social creativity leads low status 
groups to seek positive distinctiveness through redefing or changing the dimensions they use 
to compare social groups.  In this strategy the low status group works to change negative 
perceptions of attributes into postive perceptions.  A well-documented example of social 
creativity is the black is beautiful movement (Skevington & Baker, 1989).  Although, social 
creativity may not necessarily change the group’s access to resources or actual social position 
it may serve to enhance the group’s positive evaluation of the newly redefined charaterististic 
leading to a more positive social identity.  Low status groups may also elect to compare 




In contrast, when there are marked stratification between groups to the extent that it would be 
difficult or impossible for low status groups to invest themeselves in an unsatisfactory, 
underprivelaged or stigmatised group, low status groups may choose to strive for social 
change through direct competition or conflict.  For instance, in societies where there are caste 
systems, low status groups may rebel against the dominant group in order to force social 
change to alter their social standing (Tajfel, 1982).  Once social change has been achieved the 
former low status groups often guard their achieved status with militancy (Tomlinson, 2001).  
Alternatively, Rubin et al. (2013) reported that ethnocentrism among low status groups is not 
only observed as a result of competition to distinguish themselves as better than a high status 
outgroup, it can be produced as a compensatory response where the ingroup strives to 
establish themselves as equivalent to a high status outgroup.  
 
My original contribution to the existing body of literature and conclusion 
To date there has been extensive research conducted on the phenomenon of ethnocentrism 
(Bizumic, et al., 2009; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; 
Tajfel, et al., 1971).  However, there are areas of the phenomenon which allow for further 
exploration.  The present study will contribute to the existing body of literature by exploring 
ethnocentrism using a novel instrument which allows the phenomenon to be studied as it 
unfolds through interaction rather than the traditional paper-and-pencil methods where 
participants “interact” in isolation.  The present study used the give-and-get token allocation 
game in the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL)  (Durrheim, Quayle, Titlestad, & 
Tooke, 2014) which allowed participants to interact in real time as avatars within a virtual 
arena.  Participants were able to take into account the actions and reactions of ingroup and 
outgroup members when making their allocation decisions.  Thus, the experimental setting in 
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the present study could be considered as a microcosm or society rather than an experimental 
vacuum that created when participants are isolated in experiments (Condor, 2003).   
 
Further, a psychometric scale was included to systematically assess the attitudes of 
participants toward the ingroup and outgroup before and after interaction.  Psychometric 
assessment has been neglected in classic social psychology studies on ethnocentrism such as 
the Robbers Cave experiment and original minimal group experiments although changes in 
attitude were documented within these studies (Brewer, 1979).  Further, social identity 
attributes ethnocentrism to intergroup relations that foster positive social identity and group 
distinctiveness, generally predicted on status differences.  The present study included both 
equality and inequality conditions to explore the effect of status on the production of 
ethnocentrism.    
 
Bizumic (2014) suggested that ethnocentrism should be reconceptualised as being derived 
from a sense of group self-centredness and self-importance.  This suggests that ethnocentrism 
is essentially a selfish practice that stems from the desire to elevate the ingroup.  For the 
purpose of this study selfishness is defined as hoarding tokens through self-allocation so as to 
personally benefit from resources as opposed to sharing tokens with the ingroup which would 
indicate a tendency toward ethnocentrism. In contrast, sharing tokens with the outgroup may 
indicate outgroup favouritism or generosity to the outgroup should that particular participant 
be a high status individual or member of a high status group.  Evidence of ethnocentrism as 
self-centredness can be found in research exploring group attitudes toward affirmative action 
policies (Lowery et al., 2006).  According to Lowery et al. (2006) when high status groups 
reject affirmative action policies they tend to do so in order to protect the ingroup’s interests 
rather than further oppress the disadvantaged low status group.  Simply put, the ingroup acts 
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selfishly in their actions and does not necessarily consider the outgroup in their rationale for 
making these decisions.  However, selfishness is seldom considered a group-beneficial 
strategy, typically evolutionary psychology theories propose that altruism benefits the group 
and selfishness undermines altruism (Eldakar & Wilson, 2008). Game theory suggests that 
ethnocentric or humanitarian strategies (i.e. generosity toward members of both the ingroup 
and outgroup) always dominate selfish strategies (Shultz, Hartshorn, & Hammond, 2008). 
Often, those who engage in selfish behaviour may reap initial rewards but soon succumb to 
punishment by others in the social system through alienation which tends to eradicate selfish 
behaviour.  In contrast, Eldakar and Wilson (2008) suggest that selfishness can be used as 
second-order altruism to eliminate true selfishness within the group in situations where 
resources must be shared. For instance, experiments that examine how altruism evolves 
through kinship and reciprocation indicate that hoarding resources while punishing others by 
withholding resources from others who demonstrate similar selfish tendencies serves to 
create a stable environment that promotes altruism. Further, because punishment is a costly 
strategy the selfish hoarding behaviour that these “selfish punishers” demonstrate serves as a 
reward for the opportunities for reciprocation that they sacrifice as a result of punishing 
others in the social system (Eldakar & Wilson, 2008, p. 6982). It is possible that this 
assumption explains why participants in minimal group situation experiments engage in 
ethnocentric behaviours even though they are aware that they never directly benefit from 
their allocations because as human beings we have been conditioned to expect a reward in 
response to altruistic behaviour (Eldakar & Wilson, 2008).  The original minimal group 
experiment studies excluded the option for participants to personally benefit from their 
allocation decisions (Tajfel, et al., 1971).  The present study included the option to self-
allocate tokens, by including, the option to be selfish through self-allocation it can be 
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established whether ingroup favouritism is essentially a facet of selfish behaviour or if social 
identity prevails and participants are driven to act as group members rather than individuals.  























Chapter 3: Aims, Rationale and Hypotheses 
Aims 
The aims of this dissertation are to: 
1. Examine the effect of status on the production of ethnocentrism. 
2. Examine the effect of status on the production of selfish behaviour.   
 
Rationale 
There is a large body of literature supporting the theory that the idea of being in a group is 
enough to elicit ethnocentric behaviour (Bourhis & Gagnon, 2003; Brewer, 1979; Durrheim 
et al., 2014; Tajfel et al., 1971).  This thesis extends this theory to examine what effect, if 
any, status has on this phenomenon.  By introducing inequality at the start of the experiment, 
the effect of interacting as a low, equal or high status member of society could be examined.  
The option to self-allocate resources provided an opportunity to study whether ethnocentrism 
is in fact just an expression of selfishness.  Previous research examining ethnocentrism has 
excluded the option to self-allocate based on the rationale that the theory that people favour 
their ingroup even when this has no benefit to themselves.  Including the self-allocation 
option allowed for this theory to be tested by exploring whether given the opportunity would 
participants hoard their tokens rather than sharing them with their ingroup.   
 
Research Questions, Hypotheses and Predictions 
Tables one and two contain the study’s research questions, complementary hypotheses and a 








Research question Are high status people more ethnocentric than low status people? 
Hypotheses H0: There is no significant difference in ethnocentric behaviour among 
high status participants compared to low status participants. 
H1: High status participants demonstrate significantly higher levels of 
ethnocentrism compared with low status participants. 
Prediction Based on the literature reviewed in chapter 2 it is predicted that a 
significantly higher level of ethnocentrism will be observed among the 
participants who were categorised into high status participants at the 
start of the experiment. 
 
Table 2  
Selfishness hypothesis 
Research question Are low status people more selfish than high status people? 
Hypotheses H0: There is no significant difference in self-allocation among high 
status participants compared to low status participants. 
H1: Low status participants demonstrate significantly higher levels of 
self-allocation than high status participants.  
Prediction Based on the literature reviewed in chapter 2 it is predicted that a 
significantly higher level of self-allocation will be observed among the 
participants who were categorised into low status positions at the start 





Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter describes the operations that were performed during the study to 
address the aims, research questions and hypotheses listed in chapter 3.  It 
begins with a detailed description of VIAPPL followed by an overview of the 
research design, sample and sampling technique, data collection procedure, 
methods of analysis, reliability and validity.  The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the ethical considerations that were taken into account when 
developing and conducting the study. 
 
Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) 
VIAPPL Structure   
The VIAPPL enables researchers to manipulate experimental conditions by programming 
study specific variables.  Although the give-and-get game provided a platform for 
participants to interact the actual interaction through token exchange was left entirely up to 
the participants.  This ensured that the norms and structures which emerged and evolved over 
the course of the experiment were based on the participants’ actions and not experimenter’s 
instructions.  
 
The 2014 version of VIAPPL used in the present study consisted of an integrated survey 
(refer to Appendices 1.1 and 1.2), a grouping function and the “give-and-get” token exchange 
game. Manipulation of the following variables was possible using the 2014 version:  
1. Number of trials 
2. Number of rounds nested in each trail 
3. Group belonging 




5. Group size 
6. Position of groups and individuals relative to each other in the arena 
7. Starting token balance of groups/individuals. 
 
Pre- and post-test Questionnaire. 
The survey was supported using LimeSurvey, an online survey manager that allows 
researchers to develop their own questionnaires to be administered to participants during an 
experiment.  The questionnaire was administered to investigate the psychological aspects of 
the intergroup setting.  A questionnaire comprised of 3 demographic items and 11 exploratory 
items was used to assess ingroup identification, legitimacy, stability and competition attitudes 




Categorisation of participants into groups was an important aspect of the study.  Participants 
were led to believe that they had been grouped according to their estimation skills in an 
impossible dot counting task (refer to Figure 2).  Although, participants believed that they 
had been grouped according to the grouping task, in reality they were randomly assigned to 
groups in order to ensure that no systematic differences existed between groups.  To foster a 
minimal sense of groupness, participants were told that studies have indicated that there are 
significant differences between people who tend to estimate high or low when performing dot 
counting tasks.  However, participants were not told whether they were part of the high or 
low estimate group.  Participants were only told that they would be placed into different 
groups. This grouping option was used in versions of the original minimal group situation 





Using VIAPPL’s dot estimation task allowed the researcher to maintain Tajfel et al.’s (1971) 
concept of a minimal group.  By presenting participants as uniform avatars (dots in the 2014 
VIAPPL version), all social and group category indicators that would usually be used by 
group members to negotiate an intergroup setting were removed.  Thus, the social phenomena 
under investigation, namely the effect of status and selfishness on the production of 









The Give-and-Get token exchange game 
The Give-and-Get token exchange game was used as the present study’s main instrument.  
The game interface (refer to Figure 3) contained the arena and an information panel.  
Participants were represented by avatars arranged in a circle.  Participants could identify their 
avatar by the broad black outline around their avatar.  The other participants in the arena were 
represented by avatars that had thinner outlines around the edge of their avatars.  Each 
avatar’s token balance (displayed in brackets) could be seen by all participants throughout the 
game.  The information panel, to the left of the arena, contained the participants’ token 
balance and number of tokens playable per round, the trial and round number and group 
token balances (if the specific game had more than one group interacting). 
  
 
Figure 3. Game interface: Give-and-get token exchange game. 
 
Participants interacted by exchanging tokens.  In each round a participant could allocate one 
token to any avatar in the arena.  Once a participant had allocated their token the arena 
background would turn from white to grey.  Once all participants had completed the round by 




moves screen displayed the distribution of tokens during the previous round with arrows 
linking avatars that had allocated and received tokens from one another.  Additionally, token 
balances were updated.  After the final round the post-test questionnaire appeared.  Once the 
participant had completed the questionnaire a textbox appeared indicating the game had 
ended and the participant’s final token balance was displayed.   
 
Figure 4. Round moves screen. 
 
Research Design 
The study used a quantitative within-subjects and between-groups experimental design, 
commonly referred to as a mixed design.  Time was used as the within-subjects factor.  Data 
was collected on participants’ token allocation behaviour over a series of 40 rounds.  The 
within-subjects factor was complemented by the questionnaire administered pre- and post-
experiment.  The experiment had two research questions, the first research question related to 
ethnocentrism which was measured by the dependent variable i.e. the number of tokens 
allocated to an ingroup member.  The second research question related to selfishness which 
was measure by an additional dependent variable i.e. the number of self-allocated tokens.  
The between groups factor was measured using the same independent variables for both 




participants were placed into an individual or group condition), equal or unequal status 
(where participants began the experiment with an equal or unequal number of tokens) and 
low or high status (where participants in the unequal status condition began the game with 
either 10 or 30 tokens).     
 
Experimental condition cells 
The experiment consisted of four cells. In each cell, participants were randomised into either 
an individual/group condition with an equal/unequal status (refer to Table 3). Those with 
unequal status were further delineated by low/high status. Each cell comprised of 14 
participants randomised and was replicated four times. Thus, the entire sample for the present 




Table 3  
Description of experimental condition cells 
Cell Individual/Group Status  Description 
1 Individual Equal  Uniform grey avatars for all participants  
 All participants begin with a balance of 20 tokens 
 Replicated four times with 14 different 
participants per replication 
2 Individual Unequal  Uniform grey avatars for all participants  
 High status individuals begin with a balance of 
30 tokens 
 Low status individuals begin with a balance of 10 
tokens 
 Replicated four times with 14 different 
participants per replication 
3 Group Equal  Seven participants randomly assigned to green 
avatars 
 Seven participants randomly assigned to purple 
avatars 
 All participants begin with a balance of 20 tokens 
 Replicated four times with 14 different 
participants per replication 
4 Group Unequal  Seven participants randomly assigned to green 
avatars 





 High status group members (purple) begin with a 
balance of 30 tokens 
 Low status group members (green) being with a 
balance of 10 tokens 
 Replicated four times with 14 different 
participants per replication 
 
The questionnaires were administered to assess whether the interaction that occurred during 
the game effected the participants’ ingroup identification, opinions regarding the legitimacy 
of differential status positions, stability of initial group differences and competition between 
groups.  All items were measured on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree).  The scale included a neutral option being 4 (neither agree nor 
disagree).  The four scales that were used to investigate the psychological aspects of the 
intergroup setting will now be briefly described.  The items included in the ingroup identity, 
legitimacy and stability scales were adapted from established scales with good validity.  
Although, the competition items were not drawn from existing scales they were piloted in the 
2013 version of the VIAPPL studies.  
 
Ingroup Identification 
Three items were used to measure how strongly participants identified with their group. Two 
items from Doosje, Ellemers and Spears’ (1995) scale were adapted for the individual and 
group questionnaire, these were ‘I identify with other members of the group as a whole’ 
(individual questionnaire) / ‘I identify with the other members of my group’ (group 




feel strong ties with my group’ (group questionnaire).  The third item, ‘I have a sense of 
belonging to the group as a whole’ (individual questionnaire’ / ‘I have a sense of belonging to 
my group’, was adapted from a scale by Terry and O’Brien (2001).  
 
Legitimacy 
Three items were used to measure the participants’ opinion regarding the legitimacy of the 
status positions in the experiment.  Each item was adapted from different scales measuring 
legitimacy.  The following items were included, ‘The difference between me and the other 
players is justified and right’ (individual questionnaire) / ‘The difference between my group 
and the other group is justified and right’ (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002); ‘The 
difference between me and the other players makes sense’ (individual questionnaire) / ‘The 
difference between my group and the other group makes sense’ (group questionnaire); ‘The 
difference between me and the other players is the way it should be’ (individual 
questionnaire) / ‘The difference between my group and the other group is the way it should 
be’ (group questionnaire) (Terry & O’Brien, 2001).     
 
Stability 
Three items were used to measure the participants’ opinion related to the stability of the 
social structure defined at the beginning of the game based on token distribution between 
participants/groups.  The following items were included in the scale, ‘In the next round of the 
game, how likely are individual token differences between players to change’ (individual 
questionnaire) / ‘In the next round of the game, how likely are group token differences 
between groups to change?’ (group questionnaire) (Overbeck, Jost, Mosso, & Flizik, 2004); 
‘In the next round of the game, I think the relationship between players will remain stable for 




the relationship between groups will remain stable for the duration of the game’ (group 
questionnaire); ‘The current relationship between players will not change easily’ (individual 
questionnaire) / ‘The current relationship between groups will not change easily’ (group 
questionnaire) (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).  
 
Competition 
Two items were included to measure the participants’ opinion of completion between 
participants/groups. The following items were included, ‘I felt that I competed with the other 
players’ (individual questionnaire) / ‘I felt that my group competed with the other groups’ 
(group questionnaire) and ‘I felt that I cooperated with the other players’ (individual 
questionnaire’ / ‘I felt that my group cooperated with the other groups’ (group questionnaire).  
The items regarding cooperation was reverse scored.  
  
Grouping, status and allocation strategy were used as the between-groups factors.  There 
were two grouping conditions: an individual condition where group membership was masked 
and all avatars were grey; and a two group condition where groups could be differentiated by 
colour.  Additionally, there were two status conditions: an equality condition where all 
participants began the game with the same number of tokens; and an inequality condition 
where half the participants began the game with 10 tokens and the other half began the game 
with 30 tokens.  Lastly, there were three allocation strategies available to participants: token 
to ingroup; token to outgroup or token to self.  Participants were not informed about these 
strategies however they were told that they could allocate their token of any of the 14 





Validity, Reliability and Rigour 
VIAPPL 
The VIAPPL software has recently been created and is still being developed and tested 
(Durrheim et al., 2014).  Thus, the validity and reliability of the software need to be 
established over time as the programme is adopted by other researchers.  
 
The experimental design ensured that the internal validity of the study was fairly robust. Each 
experiment was conducted using a standard script (refer to Appendix 2) to reduce 
experimenter effects that may have occurred between experiments.  Additionally, the 
following control measures were observed for each experiment, participants were finger-
printed to ensure that they only participated once during the 2014 data collection cycle, 
participants were randomly allocated to avatars and participants were instructed not to 
communication with each other during the experiment.       
 
Due to the fact that a nonprobability sampling technique was used and the sample only 
consisted of students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg campus) the 
external validity of the study was weak.  However, the study was concerned with the basic 
processes of interaction and how social phenomena such as ingroup bias and selfishness in 
relation to status are produced in these interactions. Thus, the researcher was specifically 
interested in the impact of norms on interaction in the minimal group setting which may 
indicate local norms rather than universal norms.  Further studies will have to be conducted to 





Pre- and Post-test Questionnaire 
Items included in the pre- and post-test questionnaire were adapted from existing scales that 
have been adopted and adapted by various authors however the exact psychometric properties 
of these scales could not be ascertained (Obst, White, Mayor, & Baker, 2011; Postmes, 
Haslam, & Jans, 2013). Therefore, the results of the psychometric data should be interpreted 
with caution.  
 
The internal validity of the pre- and post-test questionnaire was fairly robust the same 
individuals were assessed and compared (Huizingh, 2007). Post hoc tests using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) were used to measure questionnaire’s internal 
reliability. A Cronbach’s Alpha test was performed on the psychometric data. The results 
indicated that the Ingroup identity items had an alpha of 0.84 (pre-test) and 0.90 (post-test) 
and the legitimacy items had an alpha of 0.82 (pre-test) and 0.82 (post-test) both were 
satisfactory. However, the stability items, only produced an alpha of 0.51 (pre-test) and 0.41 
(post-test) and similarly the competition items had an alpha of 0.36 (pre-test) and 0.13 (post-
test). Due to weak alpha score the competition items were removed and no further analysis 
was performed on these items.   
 
Sample and Sampling Technique 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 224 students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
(Pietermaritzburg campus).  Individuals were eligible for inclusion in the sample if they were 
registered students at the university as gatekeeper permission obtained from the institution 
only covered registered students participating in the parent study that the present study used 




consent without assistance from a parent/guardian.  To protect the validity of the results 
participants were only permitted to participate once during the 2014 data collection cycle. 
Individuals who had participated in VIAPPL experiments prior to 2014 were permitted to 
take part as the experimental conditions for each data collection year were different.  There 
were no explicit exclusion criteria that prevented individuals from participating in the study if 
they met all the inclusion criteria. 
 
Sampling Technique 
The sample was recruited using non-probability sampling.  Although convenience sampling 
is not considered ideal as it compromises external validity the advantages of this technique 
outweighed the disadvantages in relation to the present study.  The major advantage of this 
technique was that it allowed the researcher to recruit a large number of participants over a 
short period at a reduced cost (Salkind, 2012).  In order to account for the compromised 
external validity of the study the researcher strove to enhance the internal validity. 
 
The major disadvantage of convenience sampling relates to the lack of generalisability 
associated with this technique.  Additionally, the population used in the study consisted of 
students.  Research conducted by Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) have suggested 
findings using student samples should be interpreted with caution.  This is because students 
may represent a sector of the general population that may include a disproportionately high 
number of individuals who have a higher level of education or belong to more privileged 
economic strata. 
 
However, the focus of the study was on the examination of the ethnocentrism phenomenon. 




phenomenon before have frequently used a similar sampling techniques.  To be clear, the 
researcher is not suggesting that it is acceptable for the present study to use this sampling 
technique simply because others have used a similar technique before.  Rather, the 
phenomenon of interest is being studied in different populations leading to the boundaries of 
the phenomenon being adjusted to accommodate the findings that each new study produces.  
Thus for this reason, a greater emphasis has been placed on the importance of internal 
validity in the present study so that the study may contribute to the existing body of literature. 
  
Recruitment Procedure 
Participants were recruited by two members of the VIAPPL research team 20-30 minutes 
prior to each experiment.  Recruiters approached potential participants across the entire 
Pietermaritzburg campus.  Recruiters briefly explained the purpose of the study (which was 
to collected data on group dynamics using a computer game) and potential participants that 
expressed interest in participating were directed to the PsychLab (Psychology Computer 
Laboratory).  On average two experiments were conducted per day over a three week period 
at the start of the second semester.  
 
Instruments  
The study used two instruments a pre- and post-test questionnaire and the VIAPPL give-and-





Data Collection Procedure 
The step-by-step data collection procedure is described in Table 4. 
  
Table 4 
Description of the data collection procedure 
Step Activity Description 
1 Pre-experiment set up A cell with the specific 
experimental conditions and 
unique login code was created 
on the server computer in the 
server room. 
2 Finger-printing and standby 
participants 
The first 14 Participants that 
arrived at the Psychlab were 
finger-printed and randomised 
to a computer station. 
Additional participants were 
informed that they could wait 
until the informed consent 
procedure was completed in 
case any places on the 
experiment became available 
by those opting out. Additional 
participants were given the 
option to place their name on a 




were given preference over 
new participants.  
3 Informed consent procedure Once seated at the computer 
station the experimenter 
explained the informed consent 
form (refer to Appendix 3) and 
gave the participants an 
opportunity to opt-out1. 
Participants who chose to 
continue with the experiment 
were asked to sign and submit 
the informed consent forms.  
4 Practice trial The game was explained 
during the two-round practice 
trial.  
5 Pre-test questionnaire Following the practice round 
participants completed the pre-
test questionnaire 
6 Randomisation into groups for 
group members 
Following the pre-test 
questionnaire participants in 
the group cells were 
randomised in groups using the 
dot counting task. This step of 
                                                          
1
 In the event that a participant opted-out during the course of the experiment the experiment was 
cancelled and all participants were paid a flat rate of R20,00.The data collected was deleted from the 




the experiment was omitted in 
the individual cells.  
7 Experiment Following the pre-test 
questionnaire (individual cells) 
or after group randomisation 
(group cells) participants 
completed the 40 round give-
and-get token exchange game.  
8 Post-test question The questionnaire was re-
administered following the 
game.  
9 Reimbursement  On completion of the 
experiment participants were 
paid the rand value of the 
number of tokens that they had 




The VIAPPL and psychometric data were analysed separately.  
 
VIAPPL Data 
Two generalised linear mixed models were used to analyse the VIAPPL data.  This method of 
data analysis was selected because of the binary nature of the data (Fox, 2015).  In addition, 




normally distributed, as in the case of the present study (Fox, 2015).  In order to answer the 
research questions the data had to be analysed by firstly determining whether there was a 
statistically significant difference in ethnocentrism and selfishness between participants who 
had equal or unequal status. Once this was established the data could be further analysed 
using a second generalised linear model to determine whether there was a statistically 
significant difference in ethnocentrism and selfishness between low and high status 
participants.  The generalised linear models analysed the interaction between the dependent 
variables i.e tokens allocated to the ingroup (ethnocentrism) and self-allocated tokens 
(selfishness) and the independent variables i.e group salience (individual/group condition); 
equal or unequal status and low or high status.  This will be referred to as the “token 
allocation strategy” in the results section. It should be noted as a limitation of the 
methodology, that the analysis of ethnocentrism and selfishness in the unequal status 
conditions will use absolute token numbers as opposed to the relative proportion of tokens 
allocated by participants. The potential for analysing the results using relative proportions 
was only identified during the examination process of this thesis and should be noted when 
interpreting the results of the study. The potential effect of that an analysis using relative 
proportions may have had on the results of the data are briefly discussed in the Chapter 6 
(refer to page 79). 
 
VIAPPL Data Management 
The data consisted of the token exchanges made by participants during the token exchange 
game.  This data was captured using the VIAPPL software programme and stored on the 
PsychLab computer server.  The data was imported to Excel, inspected and cleaned.  The data 
was restructured into person period format.  Person period format refers to a spreadsheet that 




experiment before listing the next participant and all of their observations for every period in 
the experiment (West, Welch, & Galecki, 2014).  SPSS requires data to be presented in this 
format when using a GLM for analysis.  The final Excel spreadsheet was exported to SPSS 
for analysis.   
 
The final sheet was imported to SPSS. The data was analysed in SPSS.  The raw data 
contained in the Excel spread sheets and SPSS outputs will be stored for a minimum period 
of five years on a secure external hard-drive owned by the researcher.  
 
Psychometric data 
Descriptive statistics for the participants’ age, gender, race and year of study have been 
reported.  In addition,  repeated measures ANOVAs were used to analyse whether the 
participants’ opinions regarding their ingroup identification, the legitimacy of differential 
status position, the stability of initial group differences and competition between groups 
differed following interaction in the give-and-get game. 
 
Data Management 
The psychometric data was captured using LimeSurvey and stored online in a secure user 
account.  The data was imported to Excel, inspected and cleaned.  The Excel spreadsheet was 
exported to SPSS for analysis.   The data was analysed in SPSS.  The raw data contained in 
the Excel spread sheets and SPSS outputs will be stored for a minimum period of five years 






To protect the people who participated in the study the seven principles for ethical research in 
social and biomedical research were taken into account when planning and executing the 
study (Emanuel, Abdoler, & Stunkel, 2014).  The seven principles include social value, 
scientific validity, fair subject selection, favourable risk-benefit ratio, independent review, 
informed consent, and respect for enrolled subject.  
 
Social Value   
The study provided indirect social value because it employed new technology to generate 
information that could be used to guide future research (Emanuel et al., 2014).  As a student 
project the study provided an opportunity for the researcher to learn essential skills related to 
the scientific method for conducting research (Emanuel et al., 2014).  Further, the researcher 
intends to share knowledge generated from the study through future publication of study’s 
findings.   
 
Scientific validity  
According to Emanuel et al. (2014) research is scientifically valid if it produces useful results 
and increases knowledge.  Thus, this research may be considered scientifically valid because 
it produced useful results related to a novel method of studying an important social 
phenomenon and the results of the study may increase knowledge related to this established 
field of research.  Further, the research was carefully planned and followed the scientific 
method to answer a specific question adding to the scientific validity of the study (Emanuel et 
al., 2014).  A good sized sample was included to ensure that the result are convincing and the 
steps of the study were carefully documented to make that the study could be easily 





Fair subject selection  
Another important aspect of ethical research related to the fair selection of participants for the 
study (Emanuel et al., 2014).  Although, nonprobability sampling was used the inclusion 
criteria for the sample was broad and established to protect the interests of the participants 
that were recruited.  No one was excluded from the study provided the potential participant 
met the inclusion criteria.  
 
Favourable risk-benefit ratio  
This study could be considered a low risk study as participants were only required to allocate 
tokens and answer a few questions regarding to their opinion of ingroup bias of their newly 
formed groups in the experimental setting.  Following the experiment, the groups were 
dissolved and were unlikely to have any impact on the participants’ life following the 
experiment.  Participants were only required to participate for a short period and the 
researcher attempted to rectify any inconvenience due to time spent by ensuring that the 
experiment was as streamlined as possible.  Participants volunteered for the study and had the 
opportunity to receive a small monetary payment to the value of the tokens that they collected 
by the end of the game.  Although, the participants did not benefit directly from the study, 
this research may be considered beneficial to researchers and society interested in 
understanding group dynamics and different methods of studying the ingroup bias 
phenomenon. 
 
Independent review   





Informed consent  
The most important aspect of ethical research may be the informed consent process 
(Emmanual et al., 2014).  The informed consent process consists of five components, 
including: competence of the participants, full disclosure of the research goals, participants’ 
comprehension of the research, voluntary participation and assurance that participants have 
not been unduly induced into participation (Emanuel et al., 2014). 
 
Participants were required to sign an informed consent form before participants, this form 
was fully explained by researcher prior to the experiment.  To ensure that participants were 
competent to participate only university students over the age of eighteen years were 
recruited for the study.  Although, the experiment required a minor form of deception related 
to group assignment, this was disclosed following the game and the reason for this was 
explained to the participants.  No participant reported any feelings of discontent related to the 
necessary deception.  
 
To ensure that the participants understood the details of the study that they were participating 
in the experiment was explained and participants were informed that they could ask questions 
at any stage.  All participants stated that they understood what they study was about and what 
was required of them during participation.  Participants were also informed that they study 
was voluntary and that they were free to leave at any stage and that there would be no 
consequences for them should they decide to opt-out or withdraw from the study.  Further, 
participants were informed that they were not required to provide a reason for their decision 
to withdraw if they did not want to.  To ensure that participants were not induced to 




collected during the game and that it was possible that they could receive no money if their 
final token balance was zero.   
 
Respect for enrolled subject 
Throughout the experiment the researcher endeavoured to be respectful towards the 
participants and only recruiting participants that volunteered.  The purpose of the study was 
explained and the participants’ questions were answered fully.  The researcher and assistants 
interacted with the participants politely and ensured that they participants were supplied with 
an information sheet regarding the study that listed the details of the researcher, team leaders 





Chapter 5: Results 
The results of the VIAPPL data will be reported, followed by the results of the psychometric 




The sample consisted of 224 students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
(Pietermaritzburg campus) with a mean age of 20.61 years (SD=2.23; Range: 17-32).  
Slightly more males (54.90%; n=123) participated in the study than females (45.10%; n=101) 
(refer to Figure 5).  A disproportionately high number of Black students (93.80%; n=210) 
participated in the study (refer to Figure 6).  Only 2.20% Indian (n=5), 1.80% Coloured 
(n=4), 1.80% White (n=4) and 0,40% Other (n=1) students made up the rest of the sample 











Figure 6. Racial distribution of participants included in the sample 
 
Inferential Statistics 
Are high status people more ethnocentric than low status people?  
(Research question 1). 
  The results of the analysis indicated that low status participants demonstrated a statistically 
significantly higher level of ethnocentrism than high status participants.  However, identity as 
a group member was the most important variable that determined the tendency to exhibit 
ethnocentric behaviour.  Further, participants interacting as individuals in the inequality 
conditions appeared to display ethnocentrism even though these participants were members 
of the same group.  The individuals that demonstrated ethnocentric tendencies appeared to 




individuals are separate groups.  A detailed presentation of the analyses that lead to these 
findings is reported below.   
 
GLM TYPE 1: THE EFFECT OF EQUAL AND UNEQUAL STATUS ON THE 
PRODUCTION OF ETHNOCENTRISM. 
The first generalised linear model analysed the production of ethnocentrism based on the 
effect of equal and unequal status (referred to as Status (Equality/Inequality)) -among 
individuals versus group members (referred to as Group Salience). The production of 
ethnocentrism was determined by the participants’ Token Allocation Strategy. Participants 
were able to allocate their tokens to either an ingroup member (indication of ethnocentrism), 
and outgroup member (indication of outgroup favouritism) or to the self (indication of 
selfishness). The results indicated that all of the main effects were statistically significant. 
This suggests that there was a significant difference in the number of tokens allocated to the 
ingroup compared to the outgroup (F(3, 220) = 14.02, p<0.001, η2 = 0.16) and the number of 
tokens allocated to the ingroup compared to the self (F(3, 220) = 8.30, p<0.001, η2 = 0.10). 
There was also a statistically significant difference between participants interacting as 
individuals versus those interacting as group members (F(2, 219) = 42.25, p<0.001, η2 = 
0.28). In addition, there was a statistically significant difference between participants who 
began the game with equal status compared to those who began with unequal status (F(2, 
219) = 7.19, p<0.001, η2 = 0.06).  
 
The two-way interaction results give further insight in the significance of the main effects. 
The results indicated that the interactions between Token Allocation Strategy*Group salience 




way interactions will be presented in detail below. The three-way interaction among Token 
Allocation Strategy*Group Salience*Status (Equality/Inequality) was not significant.  
 
Token Allocation Strategy*Group Salience: Under certain conditions group members and 
individuals may exhibit ethnocentric behaviour 
The way interaction between Token Allocation Strategy and Group Salience indicated that 
participants who interacted as group members favoured their own group (F(1, 220) = 34.74, 
p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.14)2 (refer to Table 5) significantly more than participants who 
interacted as individuals.  Group members consistently allocated tokens to a member of their 
ingroup ( =30.30; SD=8.86; SEM=0.84) (refer to Table 6) more often than they allocated 
tokens to an outgroup member ( =9.70; SD=8.86; SEM=0.84) (refer to Table 6).   
 
Similarly, individuals also appeared to favour their “ingroup” ( =23.65; SD=7.88; 
SEM=0.74) (refer to Table 6) over their “outgroup” ( =16.35; SD=7.88; SEM=0.74) (refer to 
Table 6). However, the extent of this pattern of token allocation was on average lower than of 
the pattern of ethnocentrism demonstrated by group members.  This is an interesting finding 
because it suggests that the participants themselves established separate categories within the 
inequality condition.   The mean token allocation pattern by individuals and group members 
over the entire experiment is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
                                                          
2 The effect scores for the interaction between allocation target: tokens to ingroup*individual/group and tokens 





Effects and interactions for individuals versus group members under equal and unequal 
experimental conditions 
Effect F df Sig. η2 
Main effects 
Token Allocation Strategy (TAS) 
Token to ingroup (compared to outgroup) 
Token to outgroup (compared to ingroup) 
Token to self (compared to ingroup) 
 
Group salience (Individual compared to Group) 
 






































TAS: Token to Ingroup*Group salience 
TAS: Token to Outgroup*Group salience 
TAS: Token to Self*Group salience 
 
TAS: Token to Ingroup*Status (Equality/Inequality) 
TAS: Token to Outgroup*Status (Equality/Inequality) 












































TAS: Token to Ingroup*Group salience*Status 
(Equality/Inequality) 
TAS: Token to Outgroup*Group salience*Status 
(Equality/Inequality) 































In Tables 6, 7 and 9 it is apparent that the combined mean number of tokens does not sum to 
40 as it should because each participant allocated one token for each of the 40 experiment 
rounds.  Although the mean number of Tokens to Self is presented separately, these 
allocations have been included in the mean number of Tokens to Ingroup.  This is because 
self-allocating is considered to be a measure of ethnocentrism given that these participants 






Token allocation means for individuals and group members   
 
Cell 
Tokens to Ingroup Tokens to Outgroup Tokens to Self 
Mean 
( ) 
SD N SEM Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 





























Figure 7. Mean tokens allocated to the ingroup, outgroup and self by individuals versus 
group members for the equality and inequality experimental conditions 
 
Token Allocation Strategy*Status (Equality/Inequality): Inequality Breeds Ethnocentrism 
The results of the first generalised linear model indicated that beginning the game with equal 
or unequal status was statistically significant for the development of ethnocentrism (F(1,220) 
= 4.20; p<0.04; η2 = 0.02)3 (refer to Table 5).  Overall, participants who began the game with 
unequal status allocated their tokens to the ingroup ( =28.13; SD= 8.12; SEM= 0.77) (refer 
                                                          
3
 The effect scores for the interaction between allocation target: tokens to ingroup*equality/inequality were 




to Table 7) more often than those who began with equal status ( =25.82; SD=8.62; SEM= 
0.81) (refer to Table 7).  Those who began with equal status were slightly more generous 
toward the outgroup ( =14.18; SD=8.62; SEM=0.81) (refer to Table 7) compared 
participants who began as unequal ( =11.87; SD=8.12; SEM=0.77) (refer to Table 7).  
 
Table 7  
Token allocation means for the equality and inequality experimental conditions 
 
Cell 
Tokens to Ingroup Tokens to Outgroup Tokens to Self 
Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 




























Figure 6 illustrates the pattern of token allocation by participants in the equality condition 
versus participants in the inequality condition. The graph suggests that the pattern of token 
allocation between the equality and inequality conditions was fairly similar.  However, given 
that the three way interaction among Token Allocation Strategy*Group Salience*Status 
(Equality/Inequality) was not statistically significant further conclusions regarding this 






Figure 8. Mean tokens allocated to the ingroup, outgroup and self under equal versus unequal 
experimental conditions. 
 
GLM TYPE 2: THE EFFECT OF LOW AND HIGH STATUS ON THE PRODUCTION OF 
ETHNOCENTRISM 
Manipulation of the participants’ low or high status positions at the start of the experiment 
may provide a possible explanation for the finding that individuals may exhibit ethnocentric 
behaviour under certain circumstances. Participants included in the individual experimental 
conditions should not have been able to distinguish between their “ingroup” and the 
“outgroup” as they had not been exposed to the grouping task and were presented as 
members of a single group.  In order to further investigate this finding a second generalised 
linear model was used.    To examine this result only the inequality VIAPPL dataset was 
selected for further analysis. A number of the main effects proved to be statistically 
significant suggesting that there was a significant difference in the number of tokens 




There was also a statistically significant difference between participants interacting as 
individuals versus those interacting as group members (F(2, 107) = 19.58, p<0.001, η2 = 
0.27). In addition, there was a statistically significant difference between participants who 
began the game with low status compared to those who began with high status (F(2, 107) = 
19.44, p<0.001, η2 = 0.27).  
 
The two-way interaction results give further insight in the significance of the main effects. 
The results indicated that the interactions between Token Allocation Strategy*Group salience 
and Token Allocation Strategy*Status (Equality/Inequality) were statistics significant. These-
way interactions will be presented in detail below. The three-way interaction among Token 
Allocation Strategy*Group Salience*Status (Low/High) was not significant. 
 
Token Allocation Strategy*Group Salience: Under unequal conditions group members and 
individuals may exhibit ethnocentric behaviour 
The results of the second generalised linear model again indicated that playing the game as a 
group member produced ethnocentric behaviour (F(1, 108) = 11.63, p<0.001, η2 = 0.20) 
(refer to Table 8).  Group members allocated tokens to their ingroup ( =30.47; SD=6.37; 
SEM=0.85) (refer to Table 9) more often than to their outgroup ( =9.54; SD=6.37; 
SEM=0.0.85) (refer to Table 9).  In addition, individuals allocated tokens to their “ingroup” (
=23.65; SD=7.88; SEM=1.05) (refer to Table 9) more often than to their “outgroup” (
=16.35; SD=7.88; SEM=1.05) (refer to Table 9). However, the pattern of ethnocentrism 
among individuals was on average lower than the pattern displayed by group members.  The 
mean token allocation pattern by individuals and group members included in the inequality 





Table 8  
Effects and interactions for individuals versus group members under low and high status 
experimental conditions 
Effect F df Sig. η2 
Main effects 
Token Allocation Strategy (TAS) 
Token to ingroup 
Token to outgroup 
Token to self 
 








































TAS: Token to Ingroup*Group salience 
TAS: Token to Outgroup*Group salience 
TAS: Token to Self*Group salience 
 
TAS: Token to Ingroup*Status (Low/High) 
TAS: Token to Outgroup*Status (Low/High) 
TAS: Token to Self*Status (Low/High) 
  










































AS: Token to Ingroup*Group salience*Status(Low/High) 
AS: Token to Outgroup* Group salience*Status 
(Low/High) 






















Table 9  
Token allocation means for individuals and group members included in the inequality 
experimental conditions  
 
Cell 
Tokens to Ingroup Tokens to Outgroup Tokens to Self 
Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 
































Figure 9. Mean tokens allocated to the ingroup, outgroup and self by individuals versus 
group members included in the inequality experimental conditions. 
 
Token allocation strategy*status (low/high): low status people are more ethnocentric than 
high status people 
The results of the second GLM indicated that status defined at the start of the game was 
important for the development of ethnocentric behaviour (F(1,108)=30.83; p<0.001; 
η2=0.22)4 (refer to Table 8).  Participants who began the game with low status allocated their 
token to the ingroup ( =31.93; SD=7.01; SEM=0.94) (refer to Table 10) more often than 
those who began with a high status ( =24.34; SD=7.32; SEM=0.98) (refer to Table 10).  
Those who began with low status were also less likely to allocate tokens to the outgroup (
=8.07; SD=7.01; SEM=0.94) (refer to Table 10) compared to their high status counterparts (
=15.66; SD=7.32; SEM=0.98) (refer to Table 10).  Although, high status participants 
demonstrated greater generosity toward the outgroup the mean tokens allocated to the 
                                                          
4
 The effect scores for the interaction between allocation target: tokens to ingroup*equality/inequality were 




outgroup never exceeded the mean tokens allocated to their ingroup.  Figure 8 illustrates the 
pattern of mean token allocations by low and high status participants under the inequality 
condition.  The mean token allocation pattern by low status and high status participants 
included in the inequality experimental conditions is illustrated in Figure 10. 
  
Table 10  
Mean tokens allocated by low status and high status participants 
 
Cell 
Tokens to Ingroup Tokens to Outgroup Tokens to Self 
Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 
SD n SEM Mean 
( ) 



































Are low status people more selfish than high status people? (Research question 2) 
The aim of the second research question was to investigate whether low status participants 
exhibited a higher level of selfish behaviour compared to high status participants.  The results 
of the analysis indicated that low status participants were not statistically significantly more 
selfish than their high status counterparts (refer to Table 8).  However the results of the first 
GLM indicated that individuals appear to be significantly more selfish than group members 
(F(1, 220) = 10.08, p<0.001, partial η2=0.04) (refer to Table 5).  Individuals tended to self-
allocate ( =10.00; SD=11.26; SEM=1.60) (refer to Table 6) tokens almost twice as often as 
group members ( =5.74; SD=9.49; SEM=0.90) (refer to Table 6).  The pattern of self-
allocation by individuals versus group members is illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
In addition, participants who began the game with an unequal token balance tended to self-
allocate a statistically significantly higher number of tokens than those who began with an 
equal number of tokens (F(1, 220) = 14,43, p<0.0001, partial η2=0.06) (refer to Table 5).  
Under unequal conditions participants again tended to self-allocate ( =10.42; SD=12.44; 
SEM=1.18) almost twice as often as those who began with an equal token balance ( =5.315; 
SD=8.31; SEM=0.78) (refer to Table 6).       
 
Psychometric Data 
The data collected using the pre- and post-test questionnaire was analysed using repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests. The aim of the analysis was to determine 
whether interaction through token exchanges (dependent variable) altered the participants 
perceptions of ingroup identification, situational legitimacy and the stability of initial status 
positions in the experimental condition from the pre-test assessment to the post-test 




independent variables and token allocation was used as the dependent variable.  The 
questionnaire’s competition subscale was excluded as it did not have a satisfactory reliability 
score.   
 
Ingroup Identification 
Individuals ( =3.47; SD=1.41; SEM=0.14) and group members ( =3.46; SD=1.54; 
SEM=0.15) reported approximately equal levels of ingroup identification at the pre-test 
assessment (refer to Table 11). However, at the post-test assessment, group members reported 
a higher level of ingroup identification ( =3.99; SD=1.76; SEM=0.17)  whereas individuals 
reported a lower level of ingroup identification ( =3.28; SD=1.64; SEM=0.17) (refer to 
Table 11) compared to their pre-test measure.  This result is illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
Table 11  










































Figure 11. Levels of ingroup identification for individuals and group members at the pre- and 
post-test time points. 
 
The results of the repeated measure ANOVA indicated that participants’ level of ingroup 
identification was statistically significantly different between time points for individuals and 
group members (F(1, 215) = 9.29, p<0.001, η2 = 0.04) (refer to Table 12). 
The level of ingroup identification amongst participants under the equality and inequality 
experiment conditions was also analysed.  Pre- and post-test levels of ingroup identification 
under the equality and inequality experimental condition was not found to be statistically 




status and high status participants did not prove to be statistically significantly different at the 
pre- and post-test time points either (refer to Table 14).       
 
Table 12 
Pre- and post-test levels of ingroup identification for individuals versus group members  




Time (Pre-test compared to post-test)  




























Error (Time)  215 1.49   
 
Table 13   
Pre- and post-test levels of ingroup identification for equal status and unequal status 
participants  

































Error (Time)  215 1.55   
 
Table 14   
Pre- and post-test levels of ingroup identification for low status and high status participants  







































The results of the analysis indicated that participants’ perception of the legitimacy of the 
status positions measured at the pre- and post-test time points was not statistically 
significantly different for any of the experimental manipulations (refer to tables 15-17).  
Thus, further analysis of this scale was not possible. 
 
 Table 15 
Pre- and post-test levels of legitimacy for individuals versus group members  




Time (Pre-test compared to post-test) 




























Error (Time)  215 1.03   
 
Table 16   
Pre- and post-test levels of legitimacy for equal status and unequal status participants  











































Table 17   
Pre- and post-test levels of legitimacy for low status and high status participants  

































Error (Time)  103 0.93   
 
Stability 
The results of the analysis indicated that participants’ perception of the stability of the status 
positions in the experimental condition measured at the pre- and post-test time points was not 
statistically significantly different for any of the experimental manipulations (refer to tables 
18-20).  Thus, further analysis of this scale was not possible.  
 
Table 18 
Pre- and post-test levels of stability for individuals versus group members  




Time (Pre-test compared to post-test) 






































Table 19   
Pre- and post-test levels of stability for equal status and unequal status participants  

































Error (Time)  215 0.95   
 
Table 20   
Pre- and post-test levels of stability for low status and high status participants  

































Error (Time)  103 1.15   
 
In summary, Group Salience and Equal or Unequal Status appeared to be the most important 
variables for the production of ethnocentric and selfish behaviour.  The participants perceived 
ingroup identification proved to be the only psychometric scale that produced as significant 
difference following interaction in the experiment.  The results presented in this chapter will 





Chapter 6: Discussion 
The results of the experiment yielded five statistically significant findings, including (i) 
identity as a group member is the most important variable in determining ethnocentric 
behaviour; (ii) low status participants favour their ingroup more than high status group 
members; (iii) inequality increases tendency to be ethnocentric; and (iv) there is no difference 
in selfishness between low and high status participants; but (v) individuals were significantly 
more selfish than group members.  Although these findings have been observed in previous 
research, the present study contributes to the existing body of knowledge by examining 
ethnocentrism through the process of interaction.  Data collected using the VIAPPL 
demonstrated how ethnocentrism unfolds as participants interact in real time.  This provided a 
more realistic representation of the phenomenon as ethnocentrism is produced by participants 
interacting through token exchanges unlike traditional paper-and-pencil methods where 
participants “interact” in isolation.  In contrast to traditional methods of studying 
ethnocentrism, participants in the present study were able to base their token exchanges on 
the actions and reactions of their fellow participants.   
 
Group members are more ethnocentric than individuals 
It is unsurprising that the results indicated that participants who interacted as group members 
exhibited a higher rate of ethnocentric behaviour given the large body of literature that 
supports this phenomenon (Bourhis et al., 1994; Brewer, 1979; Durrheim et al., 2014; 
Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 
1986). In addition, the ingroup identification scale was the only scale that produced a 
statistically significant pre- and post-test change in attitudes. This findings supports the 
original minimal group studies’ theory that categorization into groups and internalization of 




Tajfel & Turner, 1986). While this finding is important because the absence of ethnocentric 
behaviour among group members in a minimal group situation would have been puzzling, the 
primary focus of the present chapter is to discuss the results in relation to the research 
questions and literature reviewed in chapter two.  
 
Ethnocentric Low Status Groups 
The finding that low status groups in the experiment tended to exhibit higher rates of 
ethnocentric behaviour is interesting given the strong evidence that supports the social 
identity theory that high status groups favour the ingroup more than their low status 
counterparts because their group’s high status provides positive distinctiveness (Blackburn, 
1999; Bourhis & Gagnon, 2003; Bourhis et al., 1994; Brewer, 1979; Commins & Lockwood, 
1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1979). Further, intergroup research examining 
ethnocentrism among low status group has even suggested that these groups often tend to 
engage in outgroup favouritism (Ellemers et al., 1993; Frederico, 1998; Lei & Vesely, 2010; 
Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given that the legitimacy and stability 
psychometric scales did not prove to be statistically significant it is possible that low status 
participants did not accept the status differences among participants as legitimate or stable. 
Thus, it is possible that the low status groups did not internalise their low status and engaged 
in social comparisons which lead them to exhibit ethnocentric behaviour (Brunner & 
Sandner, 2012; Tajfel, 1982). However, it is equally possible that the higher rate of 
ethnocentric behaviour among low status groups is actually an artefact of the high status 
groups’ generosity toward their low status counterparts. Nadler and Halabi (2006) suggest 






In contrast, it is also possible that the finding that high status groups demonstrated greater 
outgroup favouritism than low status groups is actually unfounded given that the data was 
analysed and interpreted using absolute token numbers instead of relative proportions of 
tokens allocated by participants. For instance, a low status participant who began the 
experiment with only 10 tokens and allocated those to members of the outgroup would appear 
to be less generous than a high status participant who began with 30 tokens but allocated the 
same number of tokens to a member of the outgroup. In reality the participant with fewer 
tokens who allocated a greater proportion of these tokens to members of the outgroup would 
be considered to demostrate a greater tendency toward outgroup favouritism than his/her high 
status counter part who allocate the same absolute number of tokens. Thus, a futher analysis 
on the data using statistical methods to analyse the relative proportion of tokens allocated by 
participants with different status positions would provide more accurate results relating to this 
phenomenon.        
 
Inequality Breeds Ethnocentrism 
The results of the experiment indicate that participants in the inequality conditions 
demonstrated higher rates of ingroup favouritism than their equal status counterparts. 
Blackburn (1999) suggests that society shapes the individuals within its system and an 
unequal society creates unequal groups. Once systematic inequalities become entrenched in 
the social system the differences that stem from this inequality become culturally sustained 
making it very difficult for unequal members of society to be assimilated in equal groups. 
Inequality creates difference which leads to the us  and them distinction that underlies 
ethnocentrism. These differences often lead to power differentials between groups and 
Guinote (2007) asserts that power effects the way people treat each other. Realistic conflict 




strengthens group cohesion and loyalty to the group and could account for ethnocentric 
behaviour (Sherif, 1937, 1966; Sherif et al., 1961). However, it is difficult to argue for 
realistic conflict theory’s position in this instance because the competition subscale in the 
psychometric scales had to be excluded due to poor reliability. Thus, it cannot be concluded 
that participants were motivated by a sense of competition or conflict when engaging in 
ethnocentric behaviour. In the absence of evidence to suggest that ethnocentrism produced 
under unequal conditions is brought on by competition it is acceptable to contend that the 
difference created by visible categories separating the equal and unequal could have elicted 
the ethnocentric behaviour that participants demonstrated (Tajfel et al., 1971).    
 
Selfishness is not a smart strategy in groups 
The original minimal group experiments purposefully excluded self-allocation in order to 
study the ethnocentrism phenomenon without introducing personal greed. While this allowed 
for a clearer demonstration of ingroup favouritism, the possibility that ingroup favouritism is 
merely a facet of selfishness could not be rejected due the fact self-allocation was excluded. 
The findings of the present study suggest that status does not effect selfish behaviour and 
both low, equal and high status participants exhibited relatively similar levels of selfishness. 
However, selfishness among individuals was significantly higher than group members 
although it never exceeded the ethnocentric strategy for token allocation. Given the 
purposeful exclusion of personal greed as a motivation for ingroup favouritism social identity 
theory is not well suited to explaing the current result. However, there is extensive 
evolutionary psychology literature documenting the effect of selfish behaviour in interaction 
(Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Shultz et al., 2008; Turner & Bourhis, 1996). Based on 
findings in various game theory experiments documenting allocation behaviour, ethnocentric 




Turner and Bourhis (1996) suggest that individuals tend to adopt group interests to the extent 
that they identify with their ingroup. Therefore, it makes sense that individuals would engage 
in more selfish behaviour than group members because individuals do have a group that they 
can identity with.  
 
Game theory also provides a rationale for why selfishness through self-allocation never 
exceeds ethnocentric strategies or humanitarian strategies. For instance, in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game or artificial world game selfish strategies such as defecting are often 
responded to with punishment. Although, selfish individuals may reap initial rewards these 
are short lived as selfish individuals tend to be punished by the other individuals in the social 
system through alienation once they are labelled as selfish (Shultz et al., 2008). Humanitarian 
strategies which involve cooperation with both the ingroup and outgroup is a more logical 
strategy because it increases the potential for reciprocation by others (Shultz et al., 2008). 
However, a humanitarian strategy does not appear to benefit a person over time as the 
existence of selfish people within a social system could result in the humanitarian’s resources 
being depleted due to limited reciprocation.  Thus, ethnocentrism appears to be the most 
logical allocation strategy because it is in the best interests of the group. By consistently 
allocating resources to the ingroup, the ingroup is enhanced and provides a network of group 





Chapter 7: Limitations  
The present study possessed a few minor limitations. The most obvious limitation pertains to 
the sample recruited for the experiment.  As Henrich et al., (2010) noted university students 
are an over sampled population.  In addition, the use of non-probability sample methods may 
have reduced the external validity of the study.  The validity of the study may have been 
further compromised due to the instruments that were used in the experiment.  Both the pre- 
and post-test questionnaire and give-and-get token allocation game are fairly new instruments 
that still require further research to establish their reliability and validity.  It is unclear 
whether the results of the experiment truly reflect ingroup favouritism or hostility to the 
outgroup given that participants allocate their tokens without justifying their motivation for 
their allocation decisions. Most importantly, the study used absolute numbers of tokens 
instead of relative proportions to indicate ethnocentrism and selfishness even under the status 
conditions where some participants began with fewer tokens than others. An analysis using 
statistical techniques that considered relative proportions may have strengthened or even 
reversed the results that were reported. Lastly, given the arrangement of the avatars in the 
arena and the absolute number of tokens available for distribution one could argue that the 
experimental condition produced circular data. According to Cox (2001, p. 1) “the 
fundamental property of circular data is that the beginning and the end of scale coincide: for 
example, 0° = 360°”. Analysing circular data using linear models could produce invalid 
results, however there is no major statistical language that provides support for circular data 
thus using well-established linear models was determined to be the best option for the present 
study as this would allow the study to be used for comparison with similar studies in the 






Chapter 8: Areas for further research 
Allocating tokens to the ingroup appears to suggest ingroup favouritism.  However, it 
possible that more can be learnt about ethnocentrism by studying the behaviour of 
participants who have the option to take tokens away from ingroup and outgroup members.  
This would provide an opportunity to examine whether ethnocentrism in a minimal group 
situation is a reflection of pure ingroup favouritism or outgroup discrimination. Further, 
examine the data using statistical methods that analyse the relative proportion of tokens that 
are distributed under unequal conditions could provide a new perspective on the data 





Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The present study successfully replicated a minimal group situation using a novel instrument 
that allowed participants to engage in dynamic interaction to study ethnocentrism. The 
findings of this study support existing ethnocentric literature built on the social identity 
theory principle that categorization leads to ethnocentric behaviour. It was surprising that low 
status participants appeared to hold greater ethnocentric attitudes than high status 
participants. However, it is possible that the reduced ethnocentrism among high status 
participants was produced as a result of their humanitarian activities toward their lower status 
counterparts. In addition, as noted throughout the preceding chapters the results of the study 
should be interpreted with caution given that the data was analysed using absolute token 
numbers as opposed to the relative proportion of tokens distributed under unequal status 
conditions.  Further, the results of the study indicated that ethnocentrism is in fact a group 
orientated phenomenon that does not appear to be motivated by personal greed given that 
participants consistently chose to act in the best interests of the group rather than gain 
personal wealth for themselves. In conclusion, and most importantly ethnocentrism appears 
to be fuelled by inequality. Under equal conditions, divisions between groups and individuals 
are apparent which appears to foster more cooperative behaviour. However, inequality 
emphasises difference which may lead people to stereotype and act upon these stereotypes 
more than they should. By engaging in ethnocentric behaviour humans stop seeing people for 
who they are and instead may begin to engage based on homogenous group identities which 
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Appendix 1.1: Pre- and Post-test Questionnaire (Individual Condition) 
Demographic Items 
1. State your age   
 
 
2. State your gender  
Female Male 
 
3. State your race 
Black Coloured Indian White Other 
 
Exploratory Items 




1. I identify with other members of the group as a whole  
2. I have a sense of belonging to the group as a whole 
3. I feel strong ties with the group as a whole  
 
Legitimacy 
4. The difference between me and the other players is justified and right 
5. The difference between me and the other players makes sense 

















6. The difference between me and the other players is the way it should be 
 
Stability 
7. In the next round of the game, how likely are individual token differences between 
players to change?  
8. In the next round of the game, I think the relationship between players will remain 
stable for the duration of the game 
9. The current relationship between players will not change easily  
 
Competition 
10.   I felt that I competed with the other players. 




Appendix 1.2: Pre- and Post-test Questionnaire (Group Condition) 
Demographic Items 
1. State your age   
 
 
2. State your gender  
Female Male 
 
3. State your race 
Black Coloured Indian White Other 
 
Exploratory Items 




1. I identify with other members of my group  
2. I have a sense of belonging to my group 
3. I feel strong ties with my group  
 
Legitimacy 
4. The difference between my group and the other group is justified and right 
5. The difference between my group and the other group makes sense 

















6. The difference between my group and the other group is the way it should be 
 
Stability 
7. In the next round of the game, how likely are group token differences between groups 
to change?  
8. In the next round of the game, I think the relationship between groups will remain 
stable for the duration of the game 
9. The current relationship between groups will not change easily  
 
Competition 
10.   I felt that my group competed with the other groups. 





Appendix 2: Experiment Procedure and Script 
Pre-experiment Procedure 
1) After all participants’ fingerprints have been taken and they are seated in the lab: 
“Please can you switch off your cell phones”. Then, read through the information sheet. 
Participants to sign consent form. Collect thereafter. Place documents on table.  
“We are conducting these experiments for multiple Masters research projects and for the 
School of Psychology. The way you answer the questions will affect the quality of the 
data. So, please can I ask that you concentrate while playing the game and answering the 
questions; also please do not talk or look around the room, this will affect the quality of 
the data and I will have to stop the experiment”.  
 
Experiment Procedure 
1) Create Participant accounts (register new usernames and passwords, type in access 
code to enter the game). 
 Please click on the icon on the top right hand side of your screen. You will see 
that you need to register a new username and password. Please do that now and 
ask for help if you get stuck. 
 Okay, now log in with your username and password and then type in the access 
code which is ____________. 
 
2) Pregame questionnaire: 
 Once logged in, players will be presented with a pregame questionnaire to ascertain 
participant demographics. 
 “Click on start to open the questionnaire, once you have filled it in and pressed  




3) Group assignment: 
 Players will be presented with the preference task, if the game is a group condition. 
“You can now follow the screen prompts. You have to guess the number of dots 
onscreen and you will thereafter be assigned to groups, depending on your answer”  
 If the game is an individual condition, there will be no group assignment and trial one 
will being immediately.  
 If a game in the 3 group condition is played, hand out a coloured sticker according to 
the group membership onscreen in order to know what incentives to give at the end of 
the game.  
 
4) Trial one (practice trial): 
 “I will now explain how the game works in these two practice rounds. In this game, 
you are meant to allocate tokens to other players. Each player is represented as a 
circle. The circle with the bold outline is ‘you’. Can you find yourself on the screen? 
(pause).  
 “Next, let us look at the information on the screen. Note that the group or individual 
(depending on the game) token balances are indicated on the left of your screen”.   
 “So in order to allocate a token: you have to click on a circle of your choice, then 
click on 'give token'. Notice the line appearing between the two players. This shows 
the intended token exchange. Now click on 'continue’ to make the exchange. The 
game waits until all of you have allocated your token in order to move on to the next 
phase. Remember that if you change your mind about your allocation, you can take 
your token back and re-allocate it. To do this, click on 'take token back' then re-




won’t run out here because you have 2 tokens and 2 rounds…Can you see that you 
have 2 tokens for 2 rounds? Okay, you can play now…” 
 “Notice that after the round, you are presented with the ‘Round moves’ screen. This 
screen shows who gave who tokens. You should be able to see your allocation from 
the previous round and your new token balance on this screen. Once you have 
completed studying this diagram, click in continue on the top left icon on your 
screen”.  
 “Now, you can try this on your own again. After you allocate your token please wait 
for my instructions. (pause) Do not click, but notice how you did in that round. This 
screen tells you how you did in the round”.  
 Click on ‘continue’, notice you are asked to complete another questionnaire. Before 
we start the questionnaire remember that when you are finished close the browser and 
press ‘completed’. Okay, press the start button and now you can answer the 
questionnaire. 
 
5) Trial two 
 Now we are going to play another game that is the same as the practice game we 
played before. This trial will consist of 40 rounds. There will also be another 
questionnaire based on this game, please complete it. 
 To begin this game, click on ‘ok’ on your screen”.  
 
Post-experiment Procedure 
 “Now that everyone has completed the questionnaire, I have to tell you that you were 
not part of the group you thought you were. You were randomly assigned to a group”. 




 “Now, I will come around to each of you and hand out your cash incentive. You will 
need to sign confirming receipt of your money. Please remain seated.  While we are 
handing out the money, please let us know what you thought of the experiment, what 
it was about etc (prompt short focus group discussions about their motives and 
thoughts about the experiments). Thank you for your time!” 
 
Experiment Procedure 
1). Stage game on the server: remember to attach the correct arena and no. of players (14 in 2 
group). 
2). Allow participants into the Lab, first scanning their fingerprints.  
3). After each participant has had their fingerprint scanned, ask them to draw a number from 
the bag to be “randomly” seated. 
4). Hand out and then collect informed consent sheets 
5). Begin the game (if it is the 3 group condition, make sure each participant has a sticker 
with the colour of their group). 
6). Thank the participants and explain the procedure for handing out incentives. Turn on the 
recorder. 
Incentives:  
 3 group condition- winning group gets R30 each, second group gets R20 and losing 
group gets R10 
For ties: If 2 groups ties first R25 each and losing group R10 each 
If 2 groups tie second R15 each with winning group R30 each 
If all 3 groups ties, R20 each. 
 All other games- individuals get the amount of money as represented by their token count 




7). Make sure participants sign the receipt of incentives form when you hand out incentives.  
Ask focus group questions while handing out the incentives. 
 
Examples of Focus Group Questions 
1). What did you think of the experiment?  
2). What did you think it was about? 
3). How did you choose how to allocate tokens? Why? 




Appendix 3: Informed Consent Form 
Information Sheet 
Dear Participant,  
This is a research project on intergroup behaviour. 
 
Brief outline of the study: This research study aims to explore behaviour in a social setting. 
The study is electronically based game, played by up to 18 players, by giving and receiving 
of tokens.  
 
What you will be required to do: The study will take place in the Psych Lab.  You will be 
required to play a game and answer a questionnaire. This will take about 20-30 minutes of 
your time.  
 
Voluntary participation:  Your participation is voluntary and you are not being forced to 
take part in this study. The choice of whether or not to participate is yours alone and there 
will be no consequences if you choose to not take part. You may withdraw from the research 
at any time by telling me that you do not want to continue. There will be no penalties for 
doing so.  
 
Anonymity: Although we will ask you to register as a research participant, your responses 
will not be linked with your name or any other information by which you can be identified. In 
other words, you will remain entirely anonymous and your participation will remain 





Research incentive: You will be given an amount of money after you complete the study 
that depends on the number of tokens you get in the virtual experiment. Each token in the 
game is worth R1 in reality. There will be an average incentive of R20 per player but please 
note that you may finish the experiment with less than this amount or more or perhaps 
with no money at all. It all depends on what happens in the game. If you end up with get one 
token you will receive R1; if you end up with 20 tokens you will get R20.  
 
I understand/do not understand that I may leave the study with little or no cash 
incentive. 
 
Furthermore, you will be placed in a group at the start of the game. Some groups will start 
with more tokens than other groups. Based on the group you are placed in you may start with 
more than 20 tokens or less than 20 tokens. This will influence your tokens at the end of the 
game and thus your incentive money. Whether your group has more or less tokens at the 
beginning of the study is not personal and should not be taken as such. 
 
I understand/do not understand that I may be placed in a group with fewer tokens in 
the beginning of the game and that this could reduce my final possible cash incentive.  
 
If you participate in this experiment you are accepting that you agree with these 
conditions.  
 






Who to contact if you have been harmed or have any concerns: Although this research 
involves very little risk, if you have any questions or complaints about aspects of the research 
or feel that you have been harmed in any way by participating in this study, please contact:  
 Project Leaders: School of Applied Human Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal: 
Professor Kevin Durrheim (Durrheim@ukzn.ac.za) and Dr. Mike Quayle 
(QuayleM@ukzn.ac.za)  
 Human Social Science Research Ethics Committee: 
Ms. Phume Ximba (ximbap@ukzn.ac.za/ 031 260 3587) 
 
Consent Form 
I hereby agree to participate in research on social interaction. I am aware of what is required 
of me, and I understand that: 
 I am participating freely and without coercion.  
 This is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally.  
 I will remain anonymous and my participation in the study will remain confidential.  
 I have a right to withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. 
 I agree to the results of my participation being used for research and teaching 
purposes and for presentation in reports and at conferences. My name will not appear 
in any of these documents.  
 I agree/disagree to the discussion at the end of the game being recorded for research 
purposes.  
 
Signature of participant:     Date:___________________ 
 
